[Traditio]

Recently, Zoo has expressed his doubt about his former religious faith. He has labeled himself as an agnostic, and he has gone so far as to assert that he, at best, can consider himself an deist. Doubt, he asserts, overwhelms him.

I confess: whenever someone expresses doubt about the existence of God and His various attributes, it always strikes me as strange. I myself am filled with tremendous doubts about so much. I doubt pretty much the entire world.

As I've often expressed to my fellow grad students (who are veritable disciples of St. Thomas Aquinas), I wish that I could believe St. Thomas in his epistemic realism with respect to the external world. If I could, then the external world becomes a "book of nature" in which God's handwriting is evident.

But as it is, I feel trapped in Kant's transcendenal idealism. With no proof to lead me outside of my own mind, I remain a captive there. Without the key of a compelling demonstration, I remain under lock and key inside of my own thoughts.

And yet, even with these overwhelming doubts about just about everything, nothing is more plain to me than God's existence. Even if I should doubt the moon, the stars, the earth...even if I should doubt my very body, I should be unable to doubt the existence of God.

And where reason necessarily must fail me with respect to religion, faith takes her place. Reason presents me with an airtight hypothetical necessity: If you are to be saved, then you must place your faith in something very much like Jesus Christ, and you must be obedient to something very much like the Catholic Church. Reason cannot confirm the antecedent. But hope drives me to affirm it, and faith, unshakeable faith, makes me cling to the consequents.

Of course, doubts necessarily must plague me:

Will I be saved?
Will I escape the punishments which I justly deserve?
Will I ever love God as I know I ought?
Will God perfect me, or will I be abandoned to my own wretchedness?

But I cannot doubt the following:

That God exists.
That He is Supremely Good.
That He knows me perfectly and He sustains me in my existence.
That all good things come from Him, and love is possible only insofar as He elicits it.
That He is to be loved with all my heart, mind and soul.
That if I could behold Him "face to face," He would bring all the desires of my heart to rest, and I would be filled with unspeakable joys.
That if I were to be cast away from His presence, I should be filled with unspeakable torments and sorrows...forever.
In the following thread, I shall attempt to offer proofs to bring Zoo to a certain knowledge of what he presently doubts, so that coming to know, He might be brought back to faith in what cannot be known, but only hoped for.

[Traditio]

1. The first proof for the existence of God is from practical reason. It is taken from the latter parts of the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant. Various adjustments to the argument are inspired by other writings of Kant.

I perceive that I am beholden to moral law. That is, I perceive that I am bound by a practical necessity to do what is right and to avoid doing what is wrong. Whenever I am engaged in practical matters, I necessarily represent myself to myself as bound by duties in the "I ought." This "I ought" captivates me in what should be called "respect," that is, the representation to myself of the idea of Moral Law.

Yet, if this Moral Law is to have its fullest effect on me, if it is to be anything more than a mere figment of my imagination, I must deny the following:

1. That it comes from the world of nature. The world of nature only can present me with an "is," an actual or possible state of affairs. It cannot present me with an ought.

2. It cannot come from my mere will. For if I bind myself to duty, then I am just as free to release myself from my duties. Yet, I perceive that the Moral Law binds me with a categorical necessity: I must not tell a lie.

Therefore, if the Moral Law is to be regarded as being something that really binds me, then I conceive the Moral Law as being the Holy Dictates of a Supremely Just Divine Lawgiver.

Furthermore, I must conceive of this Divine Lawgiver as being all powerful and all knowing; it is only then that He will be most empowered to enforce His Laws. I must conceive of Him as knowing everything that I do, everything that I think, etc. And He must dispense to me as I truly deserve, as I truly merit according to my deeds.

Furthermore, I must conceive of myself as being able to survive the death of my body. I must conceive of myself as belonging also to an intelligible world other than this world of nature. For only then shall He be able to dispense to me according as my deeds deserve.

[Traditio]

2. The second proof for the existence of God is from our aesthetic appreciation of objects. This argument is inspired by the writings of Plato and the other Platonists, including but not limited to St. Augustine. Consider reading the Phaedrus, the Symposium or De Trinitate.

Whenever I behold the world, I am presented with a multitude of diverse objects which all are similar in this: they are beautiful and good. The proper effect of being confronted with a good/beautiful object is this: it elicits love in the one who beholds it.

Love, properly speaking, is the desire for union with the beloved. Whenever I behold a good/beautiful object, I am stricken with love for that beautiful or good thing, and I desire to appropriate it for myself, even if only in my contemplation of it. When I see a beautiful mountain, do I not desire to gaze at it? Whenever I hear a beautiful line from one of the philosophers, do I not desire to contemplate it more deeply?

And does not the appropriation of the beautiful for oneself fill one with joy and satisfaction? We desire the good/the beautiful because the good/the beautiful brings happiness.

But can I love what I don't know? And whenever I am stirred to love, am I not ultimately stirred to love because I desire to be happy? And I cannot love what I cannot know; therefore, at least in some vague and dim sense, I must know what happiness is.

And yet when I turn to the world with which I am presented, I see that any particular beautiful/good object is beautiful/good only in this way or that. It makes me happy in this respect, but not in that respect. It satisfies me in this way, but leaves me wanting in that way. It brings me joy now, but I am left empty afterwards.

On the one hand, whenever I am stirred with love for beautiful/good objects, I am reminded of my initial desire/love for happiness itself. And yet, whenever I am presented with any particular good/beautiful object, I am reminded that none of them really can make me perfectly happy.

But isn't perfect happiness what I really want? Isn't that what initially stirred me to love? And I cannot love what I do not know, can I?

And so I necessarily must ascend as like a ladder from these particular beautiful/good things to The Beautiful Itself/The Good Itself, of which my ideal of happiness is but an imperfect representation.

And that alone can truly bring my weary, wandering, restless heart to complete rest, peace and joy. And so I am led to a knowledge of that most primordial and basic truth:

"Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise; your power is immense, and your wisdom beyond reckoning. And so we men, who are a due part of your creation, long to praise you – we also carry our mortality about with us, carry the evidence of our sin and with it the proof that you thwart the proud. You arouse us so that praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you" (St. Augustine, Confessions, book 1, chapter 1).

[Nick M]

Originally Posted by Traditio

Will I be saved?
Will I escape the punishments which I justly deserve?

Probably not.

[icilian fenner]

Originally Posted by Traditio

1. The first proof for the existence of God is from practical reason. It is taken from the latter parts of the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant. Various adjustments to the argument are inspired by other writings of Kant.

Oh boy.

I perceive that I am beholden to moral law. That is, I perceive that I am bound by a practical necessity to do what is right and to avoid doing what is wrong. Whenever I am engaged in practical matters, I necessarily represent myself to myself as bound by duties in the "I ought." This "I ought" captivates me in what should be called "respect," that is, the representation to myself of the idea of Moral Law.

Yet, if this Moral Law is to have its fullest effect on me, if it is to be anything more than a mere figment of my imagination, I must deny the following:

1. That it comes from the world of nature. The world of nature only can present me with an "is," an actual or possible state of affairs. It cannot present me with an ought.

The external natural world; perhaps. Your nature, however, can provide you with oughts. Humans are not the only social animals to display compassion and empathy for others; and from prediliction of care, the feeling of moral obligation can easily be derived.

2. It cannot come from my mere will. For if I bind myself to duty, then I am just as free to release myself from my duties. Yet, I perceive that the Moral Law binds me with a categorical necessity: I must not tell a lie.

This example is far too easy to disprove with the 'hidng jews from the nazis' scenario. If you would chose to not willingly decieve the nazis about the whereabouts of the jews, you would be the moral outlyer amongst those who I have seen answer the question. Catagorically never lying cannot be a moral absolute shared by all (wo)men; if you would refuse to decieve the nazis in this scenario, you'd be the first I've ever seen.

Compassion and empathy together (i.e. care for your fellows) can readily explain why people would be prepared to lie in these circumstances, without need to appeal to an absolute moral lawgiver.

Since the above sections are what your argument rests on, I shalln't address the conclusion.

[icilian fenner]

Originally Posted by Traditio

2. The second proof for the existence of God is from our aesthetic appreciation of objects. This argument is inspired by the writings of Plato and the other Platonists, including but not limited to St. Augustine. Consider reading the Phaedrus, the Symposium or De Trinitate.

Whenever I behold the world, I am presented with a multitude of diverse objects which all are similar in this: they are beautiful and good. The proper effect of being confronted with a good/beautiful object is this: it elicits love in the one who beholds it.

Love, properly speaking, is the desire for union with the beloved. Whenever I behold a good/beautiful object, I am stricken with love for that beautiful or good thing, and I desire to appropriate it for myself, even if only in my contemplation of it. When I see a beautiful mountain, do I not desire to gaze at it? Whenever I hear a beautiful line from one of the philosophers, do I not desire to contemplate it more deeply?

And does not the appropriation of the beautiful for oneself fill one with joy and satisfaction? We desire the good/the beautiful because the good/the beautiful brings happiness.

But can I love what I don't know? And whenever I am stirred to love, am I not ultimately stirred to love because I desire to be happy? And I cannot love what I cannot know; therefore, at least in some vague and dim sense, I must know what happiness is.

And yet when I turn to the world with which I am presented, I see that any particular beautiful/good object is beautiful/good only in this way or that. It makes me happy in this respect, but not in that respect. It satisfies me in this way, but leaves me wanting in that way. It brings me joy now, but I am left empty afterwards.

On the one hand, whenever I am stirred with love for beautiful/good objects, I am reminded of my initial desire/love for happiness itself. And yet, whenever I am presented with any particular good/beautiful object, I am reminded that none of them really can make me perfectly happy.

But isn't perfect happiness what I really want? Isn't that what initially stirred me to love? And I cannot love what I do not know, can I?

And so I necessarily must ascend as like a ladder from these particular beautiful/good things to The Beautiful Itself/The Good Itself, of which my ideal of happiness is but an imperfect representation.

And that alone can truly bring my weary, wandering, restless heart to complete rest, peace and joy. And so I am led to a knowledge of that most primordial and basic truth:

"Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise; your power is immense, and your wisdom beyond reckoning. And so we men, who are a due part of your creation, long to praise you – we also carry our mortality about with us, carry the evidence of our sin and with it the proof that you thwart the proud. You arouse us so that praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you" (St. Augustine, Confessions, book 1, chapter 1).

That's not an argument; that's just you projecting your wishes into the universe. There's no evidence I can find that reality bends to the whims of people except by dint of action. Wishing a thing into being doesn't make it so.

What standard would you call that a proof by?

[Real Sorceror]

Your first post poses an odd hypothetical. You ask: "Will I be saved?"

And I must ask; From what?

If there is no God, why would there still be Hell or sin? What are you being saved from that requires an outside savior? I must also ask why you would doubt your physical body and everything else you can perceive with your senses but you fully trust that God exists even though he can't be perceived?

Your second post is making a wishful jump in logic. Just because you perceive the need for laws does not mean there is anyone enforcing them. As an atheist I realize that I am the only one holding myself to my moral standards. I believe everyone else is doing the same thing, though some people would like to say their moral standards come from outside themselves.

Your third post doesn't really prove anything. It's just another flawed observation looking for something outside of oneself.

[Nick M]

Trad, believe his gospel. I can beg and plead with God. He is not unjust, and you will recieve your just punishment. There is only one way out of it.

[Traditio]

3. The third proof for the existence of God is taken from our conception of unity. This is taken from the writings of various of the Platonists. Consider the Parmenides, Plotinus' Enneads, or Proclus' Elements of Theology.

In my encounter with the world, I am confronted with a diverse multitude of objects, and yet, they are similar in this: each object is one. What secures the alterity/diversity of objects is what at the same time secures them from complete disorder/chaos. This object is one. That object is one. Yet, this one is not that one.

Yet, at the same time that I recognize that each is one, I also realize that each of them approach a unity of which they fall short. Insofar as each object of the multitude is one, I recognize that each also is many. Each one has a multitude of parts. Each one has a multitude of relations. Each has a multitude of operations. You get the idea. Each is one. Yet, each is many.

Yet I said that each is one. In saying that each is one, I compared them as like against a standard. Yet, no one of them is that standard. Each falls short of it.

Did I take the conception from myself? Is it merely the product of reason? But how could it be? Whenever I compare my reason to this standard of unity, I realize that even my reason at the same time both is one and yet many. Now I think about this, and yet, now I think about that. I move from thought to thought. And is not my thought diverse from the thinker? Is not my thought one thing, and yet I who think another thing?

And so I ascend, as though like a ladder, from a multitude of many-ones to The One Itself, which transcends the world, me and thoughts of it. I imperfectly grasp at The One Itself, of which my conception of unity is but an imperfect representation.

[icilian fenner]

Originally Posted by Traditio

3. The third proof for the existence of God is taken from our conception of unity. This is taken from the writings of various of the Platonists. Consider the Parmenides, Plotinus' Enneads, or Proclus' Elements of Theology.

Before you post the next one, consider this; do you want to have to defend 4+ seperate arguments in a single thread? This could get messy.

In my encounter with the world, I am confronted with a diverse multitude of objects, and yet, they are similar in this: each object is one. What secures the alterity/diversity of objects is what at the same time secures them from complete disorder/chaos. This object is one. That object is one. Yet, this one is not that one.

Yet, at the same time that I recognize that each is one, I also realize that each of them approach a unity of which they fall short. Insofar as each object of the multitude is one, I recognize that each also is many. Each one has a multitude of parts. Each one has a multitude of relations. Each has a multitude of operations. You get the idea. Each is one. Yet, each is many.

Yet I said that each is one. In saying that each is one, I compared them as like against a standard. Yet, no one of them is that standard. Each falls short of it.

Did I take the conception from myself? Is it merely the product of reason? But how could it be? Whenever I compare my reason to this standard of unity, I realize that even my reason at the same time both is one and yet many. Now I think about this, and yet, now I think about that. I move from thought to thought. And is not my thought diverse from the thinker? Is not my thought one thing, and yet I who think another thing?

Take-away point; humans can categorise things on many levels, and logical entities in the universe are seen to comprise of others on many levels. Seems legit.

And so I ascend, as though like a ladder, from a multitude of many-ones to The One Itself, which transcends the world, me and thoughts of it. I imperfectly grasp at The One Itself, of which my conception of unity is but an imperfect representation.

You're extrapolating from 'things are made up of things' to 'there is a transcendent thing that encompasses all' (if my interpration of this fairly vague statement is on point).

Ignoring the word transcendent for a moment; what you're arguing for is trivially true. As we are able to categorise things on many levels, so are we able to come up with a category that encompasses everything. For the observable/natural world, we call it the universe. For all that exists, even beyond those boundaries, we call reality. We can agree on that.

But what do you mean by 'trancendent'? How did you derive that from anything you said? How, specifically, are you going to define that?

[Traditio]

4. The fourth proof for the existence of God is taken from the being of contingent things. This proof is taken from St. Thomas Aquinas. In particular, see De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence). Yet, it is not completely foreign to the writing of the Platonists. Similar arguments are available in Leibniz. Consider the Theodicy or the Monadology.

The argument is especially effective if you admit that we actually can perceive the external world, and that we really have access to things.

*I perceive a multitude of objects, each one of which exists rather than not. Yet, I also perceive that existence properly belongs to no one of them. I can know what a pheonix is, and yet not know whether a pheonix exists or not.*

Yet, whatever does not belong to a thing according to its essence (for example, as rational belongs to man) necessarily must accrue to the thing as like an accident accrues to a subject. Yet, every accident which belongs to a subject necessarily must be caused to inhere in the subject rather than not.

This cause either may be the subject in some other respect (as, for example, risibility is a proper accident of a man) or some other subject. Yet, this act of existing (which I shall term "esse" from now on) cannot be caused by the essence of the subject (as risibility is caused by the essence of man). For then, it would be the cause of its own esse. It would have both to lack and possess esse at the same time and in the same respect, which would be a contradiction.

Therefore, it must receive esse from some other subject. Either this other subject has esse which accrues to it as like an accident, or else, this other subject essentially is esse.

Not the former, for then, we would be left no better off. It too possesses esse only accidentally; it cannot explain the fact that it possesses esse rather than not. If only contingent beings existed, then all contingent beings would require a cause of their esse; yet, all of them would lack a cause for their esse. Therefore, none of them would exist.

Therefore, the cause of esse must not only possess esse essentially (and not accidentally), but rather, this subject itself must be subsistent esse. It must be Being Itself, of which the esse of this thing or that is the proper effect of such a cause.

And Subsistent Esse (God) must have intellect (every immaterial reality has intellect) and will (being excites the will of an intellective being). It must contain in itself all perfections, and all things must depend upon it in order to be rather than not.



*...* This argument is called the intellectus essentiae argument. It's from chapter 4, I believe, of De Ente et Essentia by St. Thomas Aquinas.

[icilian fenner]

Originally Posted by Traditio

4. The fourth proof for the existence of God is taken from the being of contingent things. This proof is taken from St. Thomas Aquinas. In particular, see De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence). Yet, it is not completely foreign to the writing of the Platonists. Similar arguments are available in Leibniz. Consider the Theodicy or the Monadology.

Before you make your 5th argument, consider this; do you want to defend all 5, or more, in a single thread? This is already pretty messy.

[Traditio]

Originally Posted by icilian fenner

Before you make your 5th argument, consider this; do you want to defend all 5, or more, in a single thread? This is already pretty messy.

My plan for the thread is something like this:

I am going to bring 5 arguments for the existence of God. 1 from practical reason, and 4 from the four transcendentals (one, true, being, good).

Then, I am going to bring any arguments which are necessary to tidy up and give me the other things I said about God, in the event that I missed anything.

Finally, I was going to argue for the hypothetical necessity: "If I am to be saved, I must place my faith, etc."

I'll address any counter-arguments after.

[icilian fenner]

Originally Posted by Traditio

My plan for the thread is something like this:

I am going to bring 5 arguments for the existence of God. 1 from practical reason, and 4 from the four transcendentals (one, true, being, good).

Then, I am going to bring any arguments which are necessary to tidy up and give me the other things I said about God, in the event that I missed anything.

Finally, I was going to argue for the hypothetical necessity: "If I am to be saved, I must place my faith, etc."

I'll address any counter-arguments after.

This is not a sensible format. Surely you see that.

[Traditio]

Originally Posted by icilian fenner

This is not a sensible format. Surely you see that.

You are welcome to post objections as I put up the arguments, and I'll try to get to each of them.