Theology Club: What is the Difference Between Molinism and Open Theism?

[Mocking You]

Rookie poster in this section, be nice!

What is the difference between Molinism and Open Theism?

As I understand it Molinism is the idea that God knows the future based on the premise that He knows every possible choice or action a free agent might take in any circumstance. One way to think of it is the ultimate decision tree or flowchart.

Also, as I understand it, Open Theism states that there are some things that free agents could do that God (possibly) does not know. Or to put it another way, God could know that a free agent has "X" number of options, but there is always a possibility of X+1 possibilities.

Comments? Thoughts?

 

[Desert Reign]

I'm speaking for myself and not for other OVers here. I also believe that this is an area where I do disagree with OVers who follow the Molinist or 'neo-Molinist' view.

My view is that the universe is by definition fully open. It is simply nonsensical to argue that the future of the universe as a whole is in any way truly predictable. The idea of knowing every possible future is incompatible with the basic idea of the openness of the universe. The real universe is of necessity open and stating that God knows all possibilities but just doesn't know which of those possibilities will become actualised seems to me like openness in name only.

I can appreciate the sentiment though. It is an attempt to justify God without conceding predestination but without also conceding some measure of impotence or lack of control on God's part. In this view, God's lack of knowledge of the actual future is replaced by his knowledge of all possibilities of the future. It's a substitute. But it suffers from some profound weaknesses:

1. The actual future, or rather the actual course of history, is relegated to merely one of many possibilities. This devalues our lives. Surely we are more than just some arbitrary possibility? Surely there is more purpose to our lives than this?

2. The assumption is that God needs to be some all powerful magnate, knowing everything and perhaps controlling everything, in order to be God. This is effectively the same presupposition as Calvinism, which just goes a step further by asserting that God controls everything. Calvinism is indeed logical in that sense. But I don't think we need to go down that road. God is the most godly being it is possible to be. If anyone is godly, God is. But godliness was never about being the most powerful being in the world. It was about humility. 'Not by might, not by power, but by my Spirit' says the Lord.' The point of the resurrection was to prove this principle. As Jesus said, if he had wanted to, he could easily enough have called upon 12 legions of angels to save him from crucifixion. In openness theology, at least the way I see it, we need a new view of God. Calvinists declaim open theists as making God like some ordinary human who doesn't know or control the future but I say that Calvinists make God out to be nothing more than a superhuman, everything that man in his pride dreams of being - having so much power, so much knowledge, so much control. In my view of openness, these concepts are thrown out of the window. The God I believe in is not like this at all and it is the Calvinists who are making God out to be a man. As I say, I appreciate the idea that Molinism tries to bring but I feel it is misguided and something more radical is required.

 

[Ardima]

I believe that God has set the beginning and end points and has planned the end from the beginning. He has left the middle open and has given us the option to either participate in that plan and be blessed; or, not be part of the plan and miss out on many blessings. All of our choices are our own, but no matter what we choose it will not change the preset endpoint of God becoming all in all.

 

[Cross Reference]

I believe that God has set the beginning and end points and has planned the end from the beginning. He has left the middle open and has given us the option to either participate in that plan and be blessed; or, not be part of the plan and miss out on many blessings. All of our choices are our own, but no matter what we choose it will not change the preset endpoint of God becoming all in all.

What a contradiction! __ unbelievable!

 

[Ardima]

What a contradiction! __ unbelievable!

Please elaborate on what you perceive as a contradiction in that post. Its just like you to attack without proof and run. Then come back, attack again when you are proven wrong, then run again...

 

[musterion]

I thought the thread was going to be about the worship of this guy.

Leaving relieved, yet slightly disappointed.

 

[Cross Reference]

Please elaborate on what you perceive as a contradiction in that post. Its just like you to attack without proof and run. Then come back, attack again when you are proven wrong, then run again...

Sorry. Do you own research on your own ramblings. It's all there. I am done with you.

 

[Mocking You]

My view is that the universe is by definition fully open. It is simply nonsensical to argue that the future of the universe as a whole is in any way truly predictable. The idea of knowing every possible future is incompatible with the basic idea of the openness of the universe. The real universe is of necessity open and stating that God knows all possibilities but just doesn't know which of those possibilities will become actualised seems to me like openness in name only.

You're using circular reasoning. You state your view is that the universe is fully open. Then you state that knowing every possible future is incompatible with the basic idea of openness. But you've never shown that openness is indeed the state of the universe. The argument doesn't follow.

Furthermore, the openness of the future depends on the frame of reference of the observer. To humans, no, the future is not predictable. But to God?

I can appreciate the sentiment though. It is an attempt to justify God without conceding predestination but without also conceding some measure of impotence or lack of control on God's part. In this view, God's lack of knowledge of the actual future is replaced by his knowledge of all possibilities of the future. It's a substitute. But it suffers from some profound weaknesses:

1. The actual future, or rather the actual course of history, is relegated to merely one of many possibilities. This devalues our lives.

The course of history is, in fact, "relegated" to one of many possibilities--the sum total of all our collective decisions and actions.

Surely we are more than just some arbitrary possibility? Surely there is more purpose to our lives than this?

Now you are begging the question. The future is not an arbitrary possibility because it is based on the cumulative sum of our actions and decisions.

2. The assumption is that God needs to be some all powerful magnate, knowing everything and perhaps controlling everything, in order to be God.

Appeal to popularity. Anyway that's not my assumption.

This is effectively the same presupposition as Calvinism, which just goes a step further by asserting that God controls everything.

You are getting far afield from Molinism.

As I say, I appreciate the idea that Molinism tries to bring but I feel it is misguided and something more radical is required.

Besides not being as radical as it needs be, what's the difference between Molinism and Open Theism?

 

[Mocking You]

I thought the thread was going to be about the worship of this guy.

Nope, nope, nope, nope....

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uC2BMBdul0o

 

[Mocking You]

Please elaborate on what you perceive as a contradiction in that post. Its just like you to attack without proof and run. Then come back, attack again when you are proven wrong, then run again...

If Cross Reference isn't going to answer I'll take a shot. CR is (apparently) a Calvinist. As a Calvinist, he doesn't believe anyone has a real choice in anything. CR would say our sin nature makes it impossible for us to have certain choices, like to believe in Jesus, or even seek God. It's a knee jerk reaction by Calvinists that whenever someone says "free will" or "my choices" then they have to shout out the T in TULIP, which is Total Depravity, a subset of which is the idea that man has no such thing as free will.

 

[Desert Reign]

You're using circular reasoning. You state your view is that the universe is fully open. Then you state that knowing every possible future is incompatible with the basic idea of openness. But you've never shown that openness is indeed the state of the universe. The argument doesn't follow.

Furthermore, the openness of the future depends on the frame of reference of the observer. To humans, no, the future is not predictable. But to God?

The course of history is, in fact, "relegated" to one of many possibilities--the sum total of all our collective decisions and actions.

Now you are begging the question. The future is not an arbitrary possibility because it is based on the cumulative sum of our actions and decisions.

Appeal to popularity. Anyway that's not my assumption.

You are getting far afield from Molinism.

Besides not being as radical as it needs be, what's the difference between Molinism and Open Theism?

I wasn't really trying to make an argument since you just asked for the differences between OV and Molinism. In summary, the differences betwen my version of OV and the Molinist versions are that I don't count possibilities as having anything other than intellectual value. The real world does not consist of possibilities and actuality but just actuality. I have been accused of being just another Molinist (as if being a Molinist is a crime!) but obviously by those who don't bother to listen.

If you want something more of an argument then get this: you said

Furthermore, the openness of the future depends on the frame of reference of the observer. To humans, no, the future is not predictable. But to God?

This is exactly false. It is the same argument I have heard so often that we ourselves cannot understand God's purposes because we are not clever enough. Or that we are not righteous enough or just totally depraved. And the same as when I say 'But your argument is not logical and here is why' and they reply 'ah but God is beyond logic, therefore you must accept what I say.' Your statement above is similar: Human beings cannot predict the future because we are in the wrong frame of reference but God can because he is in the right frame of reference.'

The issue is not whether any particular intelligent being can predict the future. The issue is whether the future is in itself predictable. If the future is predictable then we can think about who is able to predict it.

On the other hand, if (as I suspect) what you mean by your assertion is that in a certain reference frame the future is fundamentally and inherently unpredictable but in a different reference frame the future (the same future as referred to in the other reference frame) is inherently and of itself predictable, then this is the part that is illogical. It is just an assertion that proposition X is both true and false simultaneously.

 

[Mocking You]

I wasn't really trying to make an argument since you just asked for the differences between OV and Molinism. In summary, the differences betwen my version of OV and the Molinist versions are that I don't count possibilities as having anything other than intellectual value. The real world does not consist of possibilities and actuality but just actuality. I have been accused of being just another Molinist (as if being a Molinist is a crime!) but obviously by those who don't bother to listen.

OK, I understand now.

If you want something more of an argument then get this: you said



This is exactly false. It is the same argument I have heard so often that we ourselves cannot understand God's purposes because we are not clever enough. Or that we are not righteous enough or just totally depraved. And the same as when I say 'But your argument is not logical and here is why' and they reply 'ah but God is beyond logic, therefore you must accept what I say.'

No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm simply saying that humans can't know the future but God can. Our differences are (apparently) in how much of that future God actually knows. Believe me, I'm no fan of the Calvinist's mantra, "It's a mystery, just accept it" which they apply frequently in an attempt to get out of numerous theological corners.

Your statement above is similar: Human beings cannot predict the future because we are in the wrong frame of reference but God can because he is in the right frame of reference.'

The issue is not whether any particular intelligent being can predict the future. The issue is whether the future is in itself predictable. If the future is predictable then we can think about who is able to predict it.

Maybe the word predictable is the wrong word. Maybe the word I should use is knowable.

On the other hand, if (as I suspect) what you mean by your assertion is that in a certain reference frame the future is fundamentally and inherently unpredictable but in a different reference frame the future (the same future as referred to in the other reference frame) is inherently and of itself predictable, then this is the part that is illogical. It is just an assertion that proposition X is both true and false simultaneously.

No, I meant that from the human frame of reference we can't know the future, from God's point of view He can know the future, especially since he often takes actions that shapes the future.

 

[Desert Reign]

OK, I understand now.

No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm simply saying that humans can't know the future but God can. Our differences are (apparently) in how much of that future God actually knows. Believe me, I'm no fan of the Calvinist's mantra, "It's a mystery, just accept it" which they apply frequently in an attempt to get out of numerous theological corners.

OK, thanks.

Back to Molinism.
A future possibility (IMHV) exists in the imagination only. The Molinist notion of possibilities is not the same as prediction. Prediction is about committing yourself to one imagined view of the future. The argument that because God is able to and does imagine all possible futures that he of necessity predicts the future, (or knows the future) is wrong. It doesn't matter how exhaustive his imagined possibilities are, they are still just imaginations. It is not like you enter a raffle and you buy 100% of the tickets so you know that you are going to win it. It's more like guess the weight and you just guess as many weights as you can imagine 6 kg., 6.2 kg., 6.271 kg., 6.2764893 kg. - clearly you can imagine an infinite number of weights and the prize will only go to whoever imagined the nearest one.

Future possibilities are just imaginations and being able to imagine the future says more about you and your personality and the size of your intellect than it does about the future itself.

 

[Mocking You]

OK, thanks.

Back to Molinism.
A future possibility (IMHV) exists in the imagination only.

Ah, yes, until it becomes reality. In my view, a future possibility is the result of an humungous IF-THEN decision tree. If I do this, then this situation arises. Similarly, if someone else does something, then this will happen. So, IF I drive my car tomorrow THEN there is a chance of getting in an accident. So getting into an accident is a future possibility.

The Molinist notion of possibilities is not the same as prediction. Prediction is about committing yourself to one imagined view of the future. The argument that because God is able to and does imagine all possible futures that he of necessity predicts the future, (or knows the future) is wrong.

Why? If He knows every possible outcome then He knows the outcome BUT this still allows for human free will.

It doesn't matter how exhaustive his imagined possibilities are, they are still just imaginations.

I like to think of them as alternate potential realities. I think semantics are causing some of our disagreements.

It is not like you enter a raffle and you buy 100% of the tickets so you know that you are going to win it.

Actually, that's exactly the way I see it. God knows every possible action I might take, and therefore "knows" the future.

It's more like guess the weight and you just guess as many weights as you can imagine 6 kg., 6.2 kg., 6.271 kg., 6.2764893 kg. - clearly you can imagine an infinite number of weights and the prize will only go to whoever imagined the nearest one.

I see it in a more binary way then numbers taken to seven significant digits. Either something happens or it doesn't. IF it happens then there is another possible thing that could happen.

 

[Stripe]

As far as I can tell, molinism relies on "middle knowledge" to describe how men's wills exist while God has all knowledge.

I've listened to William Lane Craig explain the position as a proponent, but it seems entirely unnecessary.

 

[Ardima]

Ah, yes, until it becomes reality. In my view, a future possibility is the result of an humungous IF-THEN decision tree. If I do this, then this situation arises. Similarly, if someone else does something, then this will happen. So, IF I drive my car tomorrow THEN there is a chance of getting in an accident. So getting into an accident is a future possibility.

This is only true of those who possess a contingent mind. God doesnt even considers possibilities because He knows what has actually happened in the future. He doesnt need to control man's will because he already knows all that already had happened in the future. For something contingent to exist it has to actually and potentially exist, and because God is eternal, there is no potential in Him. Therefore all contingent existence that was, is, and will be is that which actuallyexists.

Why? If He knows every possible outcome then He knows the outcome BUT this still allows for human free will.

God only knows the actual outcomes of every decision man will ever make. Because of this there is no need to interfere with the will of man. God has already set the end point and all the decisions you make of your own will lead to that end... God being all in all.

I like to think of them as alternate potential realities.

If they are only potential alternate realities they do not anc cannot exist. And God does not have knowledge of anything that doesnt actually exist.

Actually, that's exactly the way I see it. God knows every possible action I might take, and therefore "knows" the future.

God only knows the actions that you will have already actually taken. Again no need to alter man's will when all that exists in God is only what actually exists. There is no potential in God for he is exhaustively complete.

I see it in a more binary way then numbers taken to seven significant digits. Either something happens or it doesn't. IF it happens then there is another possible thing that could happen.

That is the only way we can perceive things in our contingent mind. To God there is only the "it happens". Remember, God is in every place in time, at every point in time, all at the same time. He only knows what is actually there at every place in time at every point in time.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

Craig and others refer to the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CFs): Knowing what any possible agent would do in any possible circumstances, God can have complete providential control over the events that occur by knowing how the history of the world would go given any creative decision He might make about which circumstances to cause to be actual, and by then making that initial creative decision. Yet human libertarian freedom is obviously also maintained.

But, foreknowledge is grounded in something that actually happens, and it is the occurrence of that future event that sanctions the foreknowledge of it.

On the other hand, whatever grounds the truth of counterfactuals of freedom is something other than an actually occurring event. The indeterminateness of counterfactual states of affairs in virtue of which counterfactuals of freedom are true is therefore of a wholly different order from the indeterminateness of future states of affairs in virtue of which future factuals of freedom are true. Though the latter are not yet determinate, they nevertheless will be.

Even granting that there are some CF’s with actual (true) antecedents whose truth might in principle be determined by actual agents it seems to be such that God could not know them pre-volitionally, if He must directly perceive their grounds. For until God decides which agents and which circumstances to cause to be actual, there aren’t any actual decisions that God could in principle know as the grounds of these CF’s. Since middle knowledge is meant to be the aid by which God determines the actual world, and yet it seems as if He could not have this knowledge logically prior to determining the actuality of a particular possible world, “middle knowledge” seems both incorrectly described and unhelpful for providential creation decisions.

I believe that the Molinist view of providence should be rejected because there are good reasons to think that there are not any (and certainly not enough) true counterfactuals of freedom. According to Molinism, foreknowledge is nothing more than the causally impotent byproduct of God’s creative act of will.

As relates to openism, see:
http://www.theologyonline.com/forums/showthread.php?p=3415136#post3415136

AMR