One on One: BR X - A Calvinist's Response (Ask Mr. Religion vs. Enyart)

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AMRA-BEQ18

AMRA-BEQ18

BEQ18: Please answer BEQ11.

The Grandstands are restless, wondering why you avoid answering, and after a lifetime of debating Calvinists, I reply: it’s not by eternal decree, it’s the questions! I asked, BEQ11, “…can you indicate how Scripture could theoretically falsify (prove wrong) the Settled View?” And you non-answered, “<st1>SLA</st1>-BEQ11- Let me state that I do not agree that the three options you list are the only ways (or even the best ways) to falsify openness.” Sam misread what I wrote. I said, “Let me give examples of the kind of passages Sam could quote,” etc. I’ve now devoted much space to answering your big three: Mat. 6:8b, Judas, and Peter; probably 3,000 words more than the scant attention you’ve paid to my argument. If you want more, you’re going to have to specifically identify an area of your argument I’ve not addressed, or offer a rebuttal to my points. But don’t worry, we’re not done with the historical Jesus, we’re coming back to the Gospels… like a tsunami.


AMRA-BEQ18 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Asked and answered. See AMRA-BEQ11.
 
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AMRA-BEQ19

AMRA-BEQ19

BEQ19: Please answer BEQ12: Are foreordination and foreknowledge the same thing?

I appreciate the succinct quote of SLA-BEQ12 which discredited the Westminster Confession as confused and self-contradictory. But neither did you nor that quote answer BEQ12 nor even mention foreknowledge. A yes or no could answer. I am grateful that you’re pasting my questions, so that all can see plainly you’re not answering.


AMRA-BEQ19 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Asked and answered. See AMRA-BEQ12.
 
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AMRA-BEQ20

AMRA-BEQ20

BEQ20: Please answer BEQ13, which I’ve here unnecessarily clarified: Is my conclusion above (from FDR) true that [as a general rule], “prophecies of future events do not inherently provide evidence of [exhaustive] foreknowledge?”

AMRA-BEQ20 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Asked and answered. See AMRA-BEQ13.
 
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AMRA-BEQ21

AMRA-BEQ21

BEQ21: Has it ever been possible for God to change anything that will happen in eternity future?

AMRA-BEQ21 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
No it has not. God decreed from eternity all that was, is, and will be. Nothing in God’s eternal plan for His ultimate glory to be realized requires change. If God must change His future then He is not omniscient, nor omnipotent, and we are all still lost in our sins. God, on the cross, said, “it is finished”, not “it is finished…I hope.”
 
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AMRA-BEQ22

AMRA-BEQ22

BEQ22: Do you agree that God did not ordain Peter’s rooster to crow because He eternally foresaw it, but because He willed it?

AMRA-BEQ22 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
With your question we are primarily concerned with the will of God as the faculty of self-determination. The Will of God may be defined as that perfection of God’s Being whereby God, in a most simple act, goes out towards Himself as the highest good (that is, delights in Himself as such) and towards His creatures for His own name's sake, and the will of God is thus the ground of His creatures’ being and continued existence. With respect to the created universe and all the creatures which the universe contains God’s will naturally includes the idea of causation.

To better understand the context of what your question one must first understand the distinctions between God’s decretive and preceptive will. They are sometimes called the secret and the revealed will of God. The distinction is based upon Deuteronomy 29:29. The secret (decretive) will is mentioned in Psalms 115:3; Daniel 4:17; Daniel 4:25; Daniel 4:32; Daniel 4:35; Romans 9:18-19; Romans 11:33-34; Ephesians 1:5; Ephesians 1:9; Ephesians 1:11. God’s revealed will (preceptive) is mentioned in Matthew 7:21; Matthew 12:50; John 4:34; John 7:17; Romans 12:2. God’s revealed (preceptive) will is accessible to all and not far us, see Deuteronomy 30:14; Romans 10:8.

God’s decretive will is that will of God by which He purposes or decrees whatever must come to pass, whether He wills to accomplish this effectively (causatively), or to permit it to occur through the unrestrained agency of His creatures. God’s preceptive will are the rules of life which God has laid down for His moral creatures, indicating the duties which He enjoins upon His creatures. God’s decretive will is always accomplished, while God’s preceptive will is often disobeyed.

A careful reading of Scriptures shows that God’s decretive will includes many things which God forbids in His preceptive will, and excludes many things which He commands in His preceptive will, see Genesis 22; Exodus 4:21-23; II Kings 20:1-7; Acts 2:23. Yet we must maintain both the decretive and preceptive will of God with the understanding that, while they appear to us as distinct, they are yet fundamentally one in God.

When speaking of the decretive and the preceptive will of God, we use the word "will" in two different contexts. By the decretive God has determined what He will do or what will come to pass; in the preceptive He reveals to us what we are duty bound to do. At the same time we should remember that the moral law, the rule of our life, is also in a sense the embodiment of the will of God. Moral law is an expression of God's holy nature and of what this naturally requires of all moral creatures.

Thus we observe that the decretive and preceptive will of God do not conflict with one another in the sense that in the decretive God does, and in the preceptive He does not, take pleasure in sin. Nor in the sense that in the decretive God does not, and in the preceptive God does, will the salvation of every individual with a positive volition. Even according to the decretive will God takes no pleasure in sin; and even according to the preceptive will God does not will the salvation of every person with a positive volition.

Your question also speaks of the ordination of God and foreknowledge. Recall from AMRA-BEQ12:

Foreordination
: God predisposes all that is to come to pass and the conditions in such a manner that all shall come to pass according to God's eternal plan. These events may come to pass via the free actions of moral agents (both saved and lost), the instinctive actions of non-sentient creatures, or via God's causative acts.

The predisposition referred to in the definition of foreordination is the necessary result of God’s will. As noted earlier, God may will to accomplish events effectively (causatively), or permit events to occur through the unrestrained agency of His creatures. In the case of the rooster, I surmise that God, being omniscient, knew (a) Peter would sin three times and (b) when the rooster would crow, therefore God permitted the events to occur through the unrestrained agency of His creatures.

Also, recall from AMRA-BEQ12, foreknowledge presupposes foreordination, but foreknowledge is not itself foreordination. Misunderstandings of these terms have led the uninformed to claim that the related Reformed doctrines are fatalistic.

From these misunderstandings, we see incorrect statements such as the following:

Necessity of a hypothetical inference...
If God foreknew the rooster would crow, then the rooster cannot refrain from crowing. (Incorrect)

The interpretation above wrongly interprets God's foreknowledge as impinging upon the rooster’s instinctive agency. The proper understanding is:

The necessity of the consequent of the hypothetical...
Necessarily, if God foreknew the rooster would crow, then the rooster does not refrain from crowing. (Correct)

In other words, the actions of moral free agents or instinctively driven, non-sentient creatures do not take place because they are foreseen, the actions are foreseen because the actions are certain to take place.
 

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AMRA-BEQ23

AMRA-BEQ23

BEQ23: Even if God were not to rely on exhaustive foreknowledge (for example, when He ordained the Body of Christ, etc.), God can be far more competent, powerful, able, and effective, than could any human being who does not have exhaustive foreknowledge?

AMRA-BEQ23 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Yes, God could be (and is) far more competent, powerful, able, and effective than any human being who does not possess exhaustive foreknowledge. But, if the underlying assumption of your question is to then argue that God could accomplish His purposes by respecting the liberty of indifference (libertarian free will) of His creatures, and thus not being able to know the future, I contend that such an position gives no guarantee of the eschaton to God’s children in Christ.

If God is genuinely responsive to humans and to the course of history, and if God cannot infallibly know the future free decisions of man, it is in principle impossible for God to know infallibly what He will do in the future as well.

If God is like a Grand Master chess player, yet human freedom is truly libertarian, how can God guarantee He will be able to respond to every move in the cosmic chess game that is made by free creatures? Yes, God's wisdom, skill, and resourcefulness is infinitely greater that the greatest Grand Master chess player, but what guarantee do you have that the novice (human) will not simply stumble by blind chance into the one in a million move that the Grand Master cannot respond to? As long as libertarian free will always exists this must be conceded to be always a possibility, even if the likelihood is small.

In other words, God's knowledge of His own actions in the future is at best probabilistic. Thus, God's statements that He will ultimately triumph over evil is no absolute guarantee. But, I know you and I agree that God is not a liar, so the assumptions by unsettled theists about God's knowledge must therefore be incorrect. The problem then, lies with unsettled theism’s assumptions of what God knows and God's sovereignty.

When we examine the 4,017 predictive prophecies in the bible, we find that 2,323 are related to a future human decision or event (See Steven Roy, How Much Does God Know, Ph.D. dissertation, <st1><st1>Trinity</st1> <st1>Evangelical</st1> <st1>Divinity</st1> <st1>School</st1></st1>, 2001, or his book How Much Does God Foreknow?: A Comprehensive Biblical Study, Intervarsity Press, 2006). Therefore, if God does not know the future, how does God predict the future with such detailed accuracy?

From the above, are we then forced to observe that if unsettled theism is true, the scriptures in some way in some places must be false. But which ways and places? Could not these tenuous means and places be the very narratives and optatives of prophecy that unsettled theists depend upon to make a case for its own dogma?

Given the probabilistic nature of God’s future actions, for unsettled theists to insist on a guaranteed final outcome in history, either:
(1) God must be able to unilaterally intervene and override libertarian free will, or
(2) Unsettled theists must assume that God's ultimate plan to eliminate evil is not an absolute certainty.

And, if God unilaterally intervenes, the question remains, given the free choices of man, how God can infallibly know when it would be the right time for Him to intervene. In effect God must make His decision to intervene based upon incomplete knowledge.

Moreover, if God intervenes, such intervention overrules the unsettled theist's free will, for God’s intervention seen to be 'coercive'. Given unsettled theism’s position on moral responsibility and sin, the unsettled theist would be forced to conclude that there is no moral responsibility for those that would be held accountable by God who have had their free will overridden by God's intervention.
 
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AMRA-BEQ24

AMRA-BEQ24

BEQ24: Will you agree that even apart from exhaustive foreknowledge, God can be far more competent, powerful, able, and effective, than could any human being who does not have exhaustive foreknowledge?

AMRA-BEQ24 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
See AMRA-BEQ23
 

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AMRA-BEQ25

AMRA-BEQ25

BEQ25: If a passage can be interpreted in an Open or Settled way, please provide a general hermeneutic that students can use to determine which may be the correct interpretation.

AMRA-BEQ25 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
The only general hermeneutic to use is the grammatical-historical method for interpreting any Scripture.

Most of the biblical cases for openness come from narrative type passages and the Old Testament prophets, which are not the ideal types of literature for deriving doctrinal conclusions. For learning who God is, passages that have as their objective to teach that doctrine are much more satisfactory.

Unsettled theists cannot rely upon narrative verses in the Scriptures to circumvent proper grammatical-historical exegesis. To learn about God’s nature, unsettled theists need to focus more on what God says, and less on what God does.

See Milton S. Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, 2d ed. (Reprint; <st1:city w:st="on"><st1>Grand Rapids:</st1></st1:city> Zondervan).
 

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AMRA-BEQ26

AMRA-BEQ26

BEQ26: Can you deny, or affirm by giving an example from Dr. Kennedy’s program, or in a past published paper, etc., whether previously you have ever publicly identified yourself as rejecting that the Son relinquished (emptied Himself, held in abeyance, divested, lessened, your choice) omniscience (or any of the OMNIs or IMs) for the purpose of His Incarnation?

AMRA-BEQ26 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
I deny it. I have never held this position. And I have thoroughly discussed the nature of the Incarnate Christ in AMRA-BEQ16, wherein I, along with all of orthodox Christendom, hold to the Chalcedonian description of the Incarnate Christ.
 

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AMRA-BEQ27

AMRA-BEQ27

BEQ27: In the tradition of BEQ1, BEQ7, BEQ9, and BEQ17, I ask: Is God able to change such that He can have true relationship:
A: within the Trinity? and,
B: with His creatures?


AMRA-BEQ27 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Asked and answered. See AMRA-BEQ17
 

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AMRA-BEQ28

AMRA-BEQ28

BEQ28: Now that Sam has agreed that without exhaustive foreknowledge, God can make a rooster crow, then do you also agree that God could employ His abilities in various other ways toward fulfilling prophecies, similarly without relying upon exhaustive foreknowledge?

AMRA-BEQ28 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
I have not agreed to this. If God makes something do something, God necessarily has foreknowledge that the something will do so.

Necessarily, if God foreknew the rooster would crow, then the rooster does not refrain from crowing.

In other words, the actions of moral free agents or instinctively driven, non-sentient creatures do not take place because they are foreseen, the actions are foreseen because the actions are certain to take place.

To the point of whether or not God could fulfill prophecies without exhaustive foreknowledge, I answer that yes, in some instances, some prophecies will work out for such a God. That is not the God I want to place the security of my eternal soul within, however. I want it guaranteed that what God says, happens exactly as He says it will each and every time, because that God is omnipotent, immutable, omniscient, good, etc. In other words, I want a God that is completely sovereign over His creation. The thing is, I don’t want to have to worry about someone like godrulz coming along and thwarting God’s plans with his Zen-like liberty of indifference actions.

In other words, I want the God described in the Scriptures.
 

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AMRA-BEQ29

AMRA-BEQ29

BEQ29: Have you previously specifically taught others, your students, or your family, or your friends, that God the Son did not in any way give up in any degree any of the divine attributes?

AMRA-BEQ29 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Yes, I have. This is all I have ever taught or believed. To step outside the bounds of the Chalcedonian description of the Incarnate Christ is to land into heresies.
 

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AMRA-BEQ30

AMRA-BEQ30

BEQ30: Do you agree that Christianity should make a conscious effort to identify pagan Greek influence on Augustine and other leading Christians, and if any is found, to re-evaluate related doctrines on strictly biblical grounds?

AMRA-BEQ30 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Yes, I believe we as Christians should never stop evaluating what we are taught or told, and are to be searching the Scriptures daily proving out these things.

But why stop with pagan Greeks?
How about humanistic philosophers?

Can we also look at liberal theologians like Ferdinand Christian Baur (1869), August Neander (1850), Albrecht Ritschl (1889), Alfred (Adolph) von Harnack (1930)and Walter Bauer (1960)? These are all theologians that laid the groundwork for unsettled theism's humanistic underpinnnings.
 
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AMRA-BEQ31

AMRA-BEQ31

BEQ31: As per BEQ1/7/9/17/27, I accept that you say you believe that God can have relationships, but I’m asking you something different: Is God able to change such that He can have true relationship:
A: within the Trinity?

And as part two of the same question,
B: with His creatures?


AMRA-BEQ31 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
God does not change. The fact that He does not change has no bearing on what you call a “true relationship”. God sets the standard, and the terms of His relationships, not man.

See also AMRA-BEQ35.
 
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AMRA-BEQ32

AMRA-BEQ32

BEQ32: Considering not verbal revelation, but actual divine historical intervention, Can you indicate if this statement is true: When God intervenes in history, the actual intervention itself cannot be a figure of speech!

AMRA-BEQ32 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
As your question is worded my answer is the statement is true. Figures of speech are words or phrases that depart from the literal language. An act of history and a figure of speech are unrelated concepts.
<!--[endif]-->
Let me help you re-word the question to get at what I think you are asking:
BEQ32: Considering not verbal revelation, but actual divine historical intervention, Can you indicate if this statement is true: When God intervenes in history, the actual intervention itself cannot be analogical to the true intent of the intervention!

For this question I would answer False for reasons discussed in AMRA-BEQ2.
 

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AMRA-BEQ33

AMRA-BEQ33

BEQ33: In Battle Royale X, the side that has often appealed to extra-biblical sources in defense of it’s position is:
A: The Open View
B: The Settled View


AMRA-BEQ33 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
It looks like Dr. Lamerson was the most frequent, but I am not sure and don’t want to count them all unless we agree on the standards for counting. For example, do I count all those books in one of your pictures posted in the BRX thread? Do I count each and every bullet item quoting some Greek philosophy reference? Do I count your advertisement in your signature for each post you made? Do I count the Denver Bible staff of consultants you used to help you prepare all your responses to Dr. Lamerson? Can you give me a list of all the research sources they used to come up with arguments and what-not for you? You mentioned how grateful you were to them, so I need the list. Should I also count the various TOL related references you made in BRX, wherein you drew upon Grandstand threads?

See, things can get very complicated unless we set some ground rules.
 

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AMRA-BEQ34

AMRA-BEQ34

BEQ34: Can you identify any curriculum resource at Knox (Reymond’s text, etc.), that explicitly affirms to your students that God is able to change?

AMRA-BEQ34 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
I am not familiar with the Knox curriculum. But I can point to a Reformed theologian, Wayne Grudem, who affirms that God is not ‘impassible’ in the standard understanding of the term. I agree with him as he writes in Systematic Theology, 2000, Zondervan, pg. 196:

“c. The Question of God’s Impassibility: Sometimes in a discussion of God’s attributes theologians have spoken of another attribute, namely, the impassibility of God. This attribute, if true, would mean that God does not have passions or emotions, but is “impassible,” not subject to passions. In fact, chapter 2 of the Westminster Confession of Faith says that God is “without . . . passions.” This statement goes beyond what we have affirmed in our definition above about God’s unchangeableness, and affirms more than that God does not change in his being, perfections, purposes, or promises— it also affirms that God does not even feel emotions or “passions.” The Scripture proof given by the Westminster Confession of Faith is Acts 14:15, which in the King James Version reports Barnabas and Paul as rejecting worship from the people at Lystra, protesting that they are not gods but “men of like passions with you.” The implication of the KJV translation might be that someone who is truly God would not have “like passions” as men do, or it might simply show that the apostles were responding to the false view of passionless gods assumed by the men of Lystra (see vv. 10–11). But if the verse is rightly translated, it certainly does not prove that God has no passions or emotions at all, for the Greek term here (homoiopathe) can simply mean having similar circumstances or experiences, or being of a similar nature to someone else. Of course, God does not have sinful passions or emotions. But the idea that God has no passions or emotions at all clearly conflicts with much of the rest of Scripture, and for that reason I have not affirmed God’s impassibility in this book. Instead, quite the opposite is true, for God, who is the origin of our emotions and who created our emotions, certainly does feel emotions: God rejoices (Isa. 62:5). He is grieved (Ps. 78:40; Eph. 4:30). His wrath burns hot against his enemies (Ex. 32:10). He pities his children (Ps. 103:13). He loves with everlasting love (Isa. 54:8; Ps. 103:17). He is a God whose passions we are to imitate for all eternity as we like our Creator hate sin and delight in righteousness.”
 

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AMRA-BEQ35

AMRA-BEQ35

BEQ35: To my question, “Is God able to change such that He can have true relationship,” Sam answered “yes” but added “depending upon what one means by the word change,” and then you withheld from the readers whatever you mean by change! Please clarify.

AMRA-BEQ35 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
I have described my position on the immutability (changeableness) of God in my opening post, AMRA-BEQ1, pointing out the many misunderstandings of unsettled theism about God’s immutable nature. In that post I clearly demonstrated that God is not the Unmoved Mover that the unsettled theist’s like to claim of those that disagree with unsettled theism’s humanistic doctrines. The position I advocated is worth repeating:

God is always the same in His eternal being. In other words, God never differs from Himself. God’s nature and character are constant, as are His purposes. God will always act the same way towards moral evil and moral good. God will always will and act faithfully.

Unsettled theists frequently like to use historical arguments in attempts to undermine classical theism, arguing that classical theism depends upon Greek philosophical traditions that have somehow undermined what only the unsettled theist thinks about the idea of God they have crafted.

Unsettled theist Pinnock states that Augustine allowed neo-platonic ideas to influence his interpretation that put God in “a kind of box” (see Pinnock’s Most Moved Mover). Boyd writes that classical theism became misguided “under the influence of Hellenic philosophy” (see Boyd’s The God of the Possible). Finally, Sanders writes that “Greek thought” and “neo-Platonic metaphysics” were a significant influence on the classical doctrine of God (see Sanders’ The Openness of God). Sanders even lumps Luther and Calvin into the camp of neo-Platonic influence that continues to “dominate conservative theology”. Thus, with a few swipes at the Greeks and the reformers (sans any serious supporting scholarship), the doctrines of God’s immutability, impassibility, and timelessness are declared paganism by the unsettled theist trinity of Pinnock, Boyd, and Sanders. Unfortunately, most other unsettled theists outside of any serious theological forum making these same claims have not spent any significant time studying theological history or philosophy. Instead they merely parrot what they have seen elsewhere (in the texts of Pinnock, Boyd, and Sanders) as if saying something more shrilly and loudly will make it so.

But, what of these claims, irrespective of the learnedness of those making them? Let’s examine the issue more closely.

No one will dispute that the early Church theologians read the Greek philosopher’s and even used Greek terms to communicate biblical truths efficiently to their generation. What is significantly overlooked by unsettled theists is that these early church theologians transformed the meanings and contents of the terms they used so as to be faithful to the truths of Scripture. We’ll examine more about this below, but for those seeking to truly learn about the doctrines of God and Greek thought, see John Piper’s Beyond the Bounds, Gerald Bray’s The Personal God, and Millard Erickson’s God the Father Almighty: A Contemporary Exploration of the Divine Attributes. Moreover, rabbinic authorities confirm that the attributes of God in Judaism have been developed from the bible and not Greek thought. See D.G. Montefiore’s A Rabbinic Anthology.

Orthodox Christian doctrine history also denies the notion of unsettled theists that classical theism is a pagan mixture. Even Boyd writes that the history of orthodox Christian doctrine has always been on the side of classical theism, concluding “I must concede that the unsettled view has been relatively rare in church history” (see The God of the Possible, pg. 115). Such a perspective is in keeping with the Church fathers, Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, the Puritans, as well as Spurgeon, Edwards, and Hodge, all of whom confirmed the classical doctrine as God’s deposited truth. One wonders that if unsettled theism were true, two thousand years of church history would be uprooted.

As noted, some unsettled theists will trot out their barbs about Augustine’s or Aquinas’ influence by the Greeks in the development of theology. That is about the extent of what they can say, since very few have studied these theologians or Greek philosophers carefully and formally. There is no disputing that Augustine owed much to Platonic thinking. In fact, it was his studies of Plato and Plotinus that led Augustine to his conversion to Christianity. The more Augustine read these thinkers the more Augustine realized that the whole of Greek thought had to be recast within the light of the Scriptures.

Likewise, Aquinas spent much of his free time in 1268 and the next five years writing commentaries about Aristotle. These were not the task of a Dominican theologian, which he was at the time (<st1><st1:city w:st="on">Paris</st1:city></st1>), and they were not written to twist the texts of Aristotle into a Christian purpose. It was afterwards, when Aquinas had more fully developed understandings of the Greeks, that he began composing his “errors of Aristotle”. Few persons who have not formally studied Aquinas realize that in all his thinking, Aquinas held to the intellectual policy that a genuine conflict between what the human mind can know and the truths of the Christian faith can never arise. There are many seeming conflicts, as Aquinas’ “errors of Aristotle” plainly showed, and they require much philosophical discussion to discuss them effectively.

The unsettled theist’s charges against classical theism are not new. In fact they are a repetition of liberal theology. Unsettled theists are copying the liberal theologians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These claims originated in nineteenth century <st1><st1:country-region w:st="on">Germany</st1:country-region></st1>, and were connected to Ferdinand Christian Baur (1869) and August Neander (1850). It was picked up later by Albrecht Ritschl (1889). The exposition of these claims that resurrected them all over again came from Alfred (Adolph) von Harnack (1930) published as “What is Christianity?” Walter Bauer (1960) further developed Harnack’s thesis.

Upon closer examination, unsettled theism’s foundations are based upon three philosophical presuppositions: love, relationship, and freedom. Sanders writes, that “Philosophical theology can lend clarity to concepts about the divine nature of providence that can be useful to biblical scholars” (See Sanders’ The God Who Risks). Yet the degree of authority Sanders gives to philosophical theology is incompatible with the historic understanding of general revelation. Yes, we must approach God according to His self-revelation in the scriptures, since the scriptures provide the only revelation of salvation. And general revelation plays an important role in mankind’s understanding of God. However, the scriptures are clear in that man’s knowledge of himself and the rest of creation, apart from God’s self-revelation in the scriptures, is not to be trusted. This is the proper role and scope of general revelation. Contrast this to Sanders’ assertion that there is a need to use philosophy in formulations of theology, stating that classical theism must be reevaluated in light of a “more relational metaphysic” (See Sanders’ The Openness of God). Despite the claims of unsettled theists that classical theism was influenced by philosophy, they do not renounce the use of philosophy. Instead they import a different, humanist philosophy into theological and biblical interpretation to understand anthropomorphisms in a personal, relational way, seeking to avoid the impersonal God of Greek thought. In other words, the unsettled theist overlays a philosophical grid over scripture, through which interpretations of scripture are sieved.

So, if these arguments by unsettled theists are not new, then what are they really about? I will let Pinnock (I could cite others, so skip the whole “we don’t support Pinnock’s views’ retort) describe the motivation by unsettled theists to claim ancient thoughts have polluted classical theism:

Modern culture can actually assist us in this task because the contemporary horizon is more congenial to dynamic thinking about God than is the Greek portrait. Today it is easier to invite people to find fulfillment in a dynamic, personal God than it would be to ask them to find it in a deity who is immutable and self-enclosed. Modern thinking has more room for a God who is personal (even tripersonal) than it does for a God as absolute substance. We ought to be grateful for those features of modern culture, which make it easier to recover the biblical witness.” (The Openness of God, pg. 107)

We are making peace with the culture of modernity.” (ibid., emphasis mine)

Well, here we have the real motivation of unsettled theism: mixing a theological system with contemporary culture which appeals to our modern world. After all, ours is a world nowadays that needs a feel-good God in its culture of selfishness, extravagance, and self-absorption. Philosophical humanism, liberalism, and modernism packaged up in the guise of new revelation.

Also, in AMRA-BEQ7 I noted the logical conclusion of the unsettled theist’s changeable God, in that this God is not the God of Abraham, for He has long since changed from accretion of knowledge based upon the actions of the unsettled theist’s liberty of indifference.

In AMRA-BEQ9 I made it clear that there is nothing in the understanding of the orthodox position on immutability that needs to be changed.

In AMRA-BEQ17, I argued that the underlying premise for unsettled theism’s position on immutability, that is, the need for a “true” relationship with God and His creatures is humanism, making God in the image of man. I also argued that God is not immobile and enters into personal, loving, relationships with His creatures, and cares for their happiness. Moreover, God enters into many relations with His creatures and lives their lives with them. Indeed, change occurs all around God, the relations of His creatures change to Him, but, fortunately, there is no change in God’s Being, attributes, purpose, motives, or His promises.

In AMRQ-BEQ21, I argued that all that was, is, and will be has been so decreed by God such that His eternal plan for realization of His glory will be realized. The future is known explicitly to God and is fixed by Him.

In AMRA-BEQ34 I affirm my agreement with Wayne Grudem in his description of the impassibility of God. But what Grudem fails to describe more fully is that God is not one whose emotions are out of control. He is reasoned and purposed. For example, His hate burns always perfectly hot against sin as does His Love for the righteous.

We must not confuse the want inherent in "passion" with feelings. Passion implies desire for what one does not have. God does not want. However, to say that God is impassable in the sense that he has no passions or cravings for fulfillment is not to say that he has no feelings. God feels anger at sin and rejoices in righteousness. But God’s feelings are unchanging. He always, unchangingly, feels the same sense of anger at sin. He never ceases to rejoice in goodness and lightness. Thus, God has no changing passions, but he does have unchanging feelings.

Carefully consider what you and other unsettled theists are saying: Your God can be wounded; God is regularly frustrated when His creatures thwart His plans; God is bitterly disappointed when His will is checked—as it regularly is by the so-called liberty of indifference of His creatures. The God of the unsettled theist is in the hands of angry sinners since only their kind of God is capable of love, tenderness, or affections. Unsettled theists will claim that the classical theist's God is detached, apathetic, and has no sensitivity.

We all like to think of God in our own human terms, despite the admonishments of Psalms 50:21; Isaiah 55:8-9; Ephesians 3:19; and Romans 11:33. God's love does not wax and wane. Human love and divine love are clearly spelled out in 1 Corinthians 13, both having many of the same characteristics. Yet there is not a single verse in the scriptures describing the characteristic of love has anything at all to do with passion. Real love is not at all like the emotion we refer to when we mention “love”. Thus, the Scriptures, not our human experiences, must guide our understandings of the affections of God. And anyone who devotes time biblically studying God’s affections, whether unsettled or classical theist will find that God’s Word places the divine affections on a level infinitely higher than our passions. While we learn much from anthropomorphisms, God’s affections, for the most part remain impenetrable. (For more discussion of God’s love see AMRA-BEQ6.)

For example, what are we to make of an impassible God who we find dealing with the Israelites in Sinai:

Exodus 32:9 And the LORD said to Moses, "I have seen this people, and behold, it is a stiff-necked people.
Exodus 32:10 Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may burn hot against them and I may consume them, in order that I may make a great nation of you."
Exodus 32:11 But Moses implored the LORD his God and said, "O LORD, why does your wrath burn hot against your people, whom you have brought out of the land of Egypt with great power and with a mighty hand?

Two observations can be made from these passages. First, we don’t imagine that God is subject to temper tantrums. We know that God’s wrath against sin is something more than just a mood swing and we do not interpret this passage with simple literalness. Why? We learn from James 1:17 that God is not subject to variableness. God could not be literally wavering or regretting (1 Samuel 15:29) about His covenant (Deuteronomy 4:31). And Moses’ pleas would not have literally changed the mind of God (see Numbers 23:19). Thus a strictly literal interpretation of the anthropomorphisms in the passages above is impossible without distorting the character or the trustworthiness of God.

Secondly, we observe God’s righteous anger in the passage above. Anyone, especially unsettled theists, claiming that the God of classical theism is detached, apathetic, or insensitive must recognize the fallacy of their claims. We begin to make sense of impassibility by realizing the impossibility of comprehending God’s mind.

We can also examine the anthropomorphisms for real meanings. Yes, they are metaphors, but they mean something and also do not mean something. They mean that God is reassuring us that He is not indifferent or uninvolved with His creation. They do not mean that God is subject to passions, mood swings, etc.

That God does not change His mind in no way implies that God is devoid of thought. That God is not subject to passions in no way implies that God is devoid of feelings. What these do mean is that God’s mind and feelings are not like our thoughts and passions. God’s affections are never involuntary, irrational, or out of control.

J. I. Packer writes on impassibility:
“This means, not that God is impassive and unfeeling (a frequent misunderstanding), but that no created beings can inflict pain, suffering and distress on him at their own will. In so far as God enters into suffering and grief (which Scripture's many anthropopathisms, plus the fact of the cross, show that he does), it is by his own deliberate decision; he is never his creatures' hapless victim. The Christian mainstream has construed impassibility as meaning not that God is a stranger to joy and delight, but rather that his joy is permanent, clouded by no involuntary pain.” (<st1:city w:st="on"><st1>Ferguson</st1></st1:city> and Wright, New Dictionary of Theology)

Also,
“[Impassibility is] not impassivity, unconcern, and impersonal detachment in face of the creation; not insensitivity and indifference to the distresses of a fallen world; not inability or unwillingness to empathize with human pain and grief; but simply that God's experiences do not come upon him as ours come upon us, for his are foreknown, willed and chosen by himself, and are not involuntary surprises forced on him from outside, apart from his own decision, in the way that ours regularly are.” (See Peter T. O'Brien and David G. Peterson, God Who Is Rich in Mercy)
 
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AMRA-BEQ36

AMRA-BEQ36

BEQ36: Please explicitly answer BEQ30: Do you agree that Christianity should make a conscious effort to identify pagan Greek influence on Augustine and other leading Christians, and if any is found, to re-evaluate related doctrines on strictly biblical grounds?

AMRA-BEQ36 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
Asked and answered. See AMRA-BEQ30.
 

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AMRA-BEQ37

AMRA-BEQ37

BEQ37: Please explain why you do not concur with my 5B evidence of direct pagan philosophical influence on Augustine and other leading Christians.

AMRA-BEQ37 - Ask Mr. Religion Responds:
In AMRA-BEQ35, I discuss the mis-characterizations of unsettled theism about the so-called pagan philosophical influence upon Christianity, clearly showing that the early theologians, such as Augustine, rejected erroneous thinking of the Greeks wherever such thinking was not shown to be biblical. Your argument is a category error and is built upon genetic fallacies.
 
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