From the paper
"We live in the age of information, but the denition of
information is surprisingly controversial. Often, the denition of
information is connected to communication, the transmission
of messages between intelligent beings (or machines
designed by them). This entangles the discussion in issues
of the nature of intelligence, consciousness, and purposive
intent. It may be fruitful to have a secondary discussion
on the concept of “semantic” information, which explicitly
accounts for the meaning of messages between intelligent
agents, but if our denition of information is tied to this,
then we must say that there is no information in biological
systems at microscopic levels where there is presumably no
intelligent communication happening. Yet the use of the term
“information” in regard to biological systems is ubiquitous.1,2
Rather than rejecting this terminology, we can adopt it as
justied if we can nd a denition of information content
derived entirely from the physical properties of a system."
I like Snoke's way of thinking here, but I think it overlooks the fact that, when viewed as a physical property, the information content of system can not be quantified until a mind makes a decision as to which distinct states will be recognized.
Wouldn't a materialist say that if something cannot be measured or quantified, then that thing [information] does not exist?
Snoke seems to think this does not matter, but I am not sure I agree..
"An information-processing
system selects and acts on one of Ω possibilities. It is possible,
of course, for an intelligent agent to perform selections, but a
selection process does not intrinsically require the presence
of intelligence; any physical system which has a macroscopic
action one way in response to a particular selected state,
and not the same way in response to others, may be said to
engage in selection."
Anyway, the paper is a worthwhile read for anyone who is interested in these things. Ultimately he concludes there is no meaningful pathway for multi-bit processors required for life to arise naturally.
I'm not sure you've posted enough of the author's argument to fully evaluate his position.
My difficulty with treating information as a purely physical property is that information is never simply "matter arranged in a particular way." Information exists only insofar as distinct states are recognized as distinct. Before information can be measured, counted, or quantified, some criterion must exist by which one state is distinguished from another. The physical arrangement alone does not tell us which distinctions matter. That becomes especially relevant when discussing self-replicating systems. How could any autonomous thing, meaning something not being actively manipulated by a thinking mind, reproduce itself without preserving and transmitting the information that defines it as being what it is? Replication is not merely the rearrangement of matter. It is the preservation of a highly specific pattern across time.
Machines of any sort, whether self-replicating or not, are information in physical form. Whether a machine is simple or complex, large or small, is irrelevant. Every bolt, cog, wheel, switch, wire, and valve embodies an answer to a question. Why this shape? Why this material? Why this location? Why this sequence of operations? The machine is the physical embodiment of countless decisions. Ayn Rand, an atheist, expressed something very close to this idea when she described motors as "a moral code cast in steel." The phrase is provocative, but there is an important truth behind it. A machine is not merely metal. It is thought embodied in physical matter. Its structure reflects solutions to problems and answers to questions.
This is why information cannot be reduced entirely to physical states. Physical states certainly exist, but information involves more than matter and energy alone. It involves the selection of one possibility from among many alternatives. The physical arrangement is one thing, but it is the significance of that arrangement is what we call information. Snoke may be correct that selection does not necessarily require intelligence once a selection mechanism already exists, but the question is how the first information-bearing selection mechanism arises in the absence of mind. Indeed, it cannot do so because information is not merely an improbable physical configuration. It is a configuration that has been selected from among alternatives according to some criterion.
The moment you ask why one state was selected rather than another, you're introducing concepts such as function, purpose, meaning, etc. Those concepts do not fall out of mindless physical processes. They are relational concepts that depend upon a distinction between correct and incorrect, successful and unsuccessful, true and false. Every machine embodies such distinctions. Every component of it exists because it answers a question concerning the machine's intended function.
Remove the questions and the answers disappear with them. What remains is merely matter arranged in one way rather than another. The challenge, therefore, is not explaining how matter can assume an improbable arrangement. The challenge is explaining how matter can come to embody answers to questions when no question has been asked.
